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I. ARGUMENT 
A. The VCPA erroneously believes that a board's redundant appointment of an 
incumbent director supplants the plain and unambiguous text of LC. §§ 31-4305 
and 31-4306(2) that a director holds office until a successor is elected and qualified 
thereby rendering the incumbent a usurper of office and disenfranchising the 
citzenry. 
As a matter of law pursuant to LC. § 31-4305, an incumbent holds office with authority 
of law "until a successor is elected and has qualified". 1 Yvette Davis was the incumbent sub-
district (3) director. No successor had been elected and qualified. Therefore, Ms. Davis lawfully 
held title to office until the May 2011 election. Erroneously paraphrasing Clark v. Wonnacott, 
30 Idaho 98, 162 P. 1074 (1917), the VCPA argues that the SVCRD's invalid albeit redundant 
reappointment of Ms. Davis supersedes and supplants the plain text of I.C. § 31-4305; that the 
Board and Ms. Davis' culpability acts as a waiver forfeiting an incumbent's presumption to hold 
office with authority oflaw. Absent any controlling authority, the VCPA's legal theory not only 
misapplies Clark, overtly contradicts the applicable statutes, but would also disenfranchise the 
• • 2 
citizenry. 
1 City of Heutter v. Keene, 244 P.3d 157 (2010); Big Wood Canal Co., v. Chapman, 45 Idaho 380, 263 P. 45 
(1927); Clark v. Wonnacott, 30 Idaho 98, 162 P. 1074 (1917), People v. Green, 1Idaho235 (1869) (the right of the 
incumbent to hold office until his successor is elected and qualified was as much a part of the estate in office as the 
original term.) See also LC. § 67-303 which provides: 
Holding office after expiration of term. Every officer elected or appointed for a fixed term shall 
hold office until his successor is elected or appointed and qualified, unless the statute under which 
he is elected or appointed expressly declares the contrary. 
LC. § 59-901(6) limits a "vacancy" to a 
failure to elect at the proper election, there being no incumbent to continue in office until his 
successor is elected and qualified, nor other provisions relating thereto. 
2 See Clark, 30 Idaho at 103-104, 162 P. at 1074 citing to several sources. 
Unquestionably this statute was enacted with a view to preventing the office of superintendent of 
schools from becoming vacant during any part of the time, and unquestionably it means just what 
it says-in effect that one, once lawfully elected and qualified, continues to hold the office until his 
successor is elected and qualified. 
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In Clark, the incumbent county assessor (Wonnacott) lost in an election to McFarland, 
but McFarland died shortly after the election and before his term of office commenced. The 
Kootenai County Commissioners' solution was to declare the position vacant and appoint Clark 
to serve the remainder of the term. This Court determined that the Commissioner's appointment 
of someone other than the incumbent was "ineffectual and void" (as opposed to voidable).3 
"There can be no appointment unless there is a vacancy; there can be no vacancy 
where there is an incumbent." There was in effect a statute providing that every 
person elected for a fixed term "shall hold office until his successor is elected .... 
and qualified." Thus, Wonnacott was entitled to hold the office until his successor 
was elected and qualified. "[U]nder our statutes the person elected to an office 
does not become the incumbent of the office until he qualifies." We held "that if 
an officer under the law is entitled to hold his office until his successor is elected 
and qualified, that the election of the officer does not create a vacancy, but it 
requires his election and qualification coupled with the expiration of his 
predecessor's term to create a vacancy." ... We held that Wonnacott remained the 
incumbent because McFarland had not qualified. "Had Mr. McFarland lived and 
failed to qualify there would have been no vacancy, under our statutes, because 
there was an incumbent to continue in office, whose right it was to hold the office 
until his successor was not only duly elected, but also qualified ... 4 
Had the SVCRD appointed someone other than Ms. Davis, the appointment would similarly be 
rendered ineffectual and void; irrespective of the complicity or actions of the SVCRD board. 
Ms. Davis' redundant appointment, even if erroneous, would only mean that Ms. Davis has 
usurped herself and thus the issue is moot. The conclusion to be drawn from Clark and Reutter 
is that the actions of the board are ineffectual, void, and thus irrelevant and do not supersede the 
plain text of LC.§ 31-4305. 
The VCP A wishes to distinguish Clark from this action by asserting a "dereliction of 
duty by the SVCRD Board"5; that "errors in the ... election cycle ... fall squarely on the SVCRD 
3 Clark, 30 Idaho at 108, 162 P. at 1074. 
4 City of Heutter, 244 P.3d at 159-160 (internal citations omitted). The regularly scheduled election, while not 
cancelled as in this action, was nonetheless rendered void and ineffectual as if it had never occurred due to 
McFarland's failure to qualify. The same is true here. 
5 Reply Brief, p. 5. 
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Board, which created the problem."6 It is undisputed that the VCPA does not allege nor did the 
district court find any "fraud or intentional wrongdoing on the part of the Directors of the 
SVCRD". 7 Yet, the VCP A concludes that Ms. Davis, as the incumbent candidate, "was 
responsible for the failure to have an election"; that she "should have been aware of when her 
term would expire." 
No matter who the SVCRD Board delegates the responsibilities to, it is ultimately 
their job to prepare and publish election notices and cancellations, making sure 
the election schedule is followed for their district. [sic ]8 
This is not true. Not surprisingly, the VCPA fails to assert to any authority that vests a 
candidate/incumbent director with the responsibility to prepare and publish election notices and 
otherwise oversee the conduct of an election in which he/she is the candidate. Quite the 
contrary, to prevent such inherent conflicts of interest, Title 34 of the Idaho Code vests 
investigatory, supervisory, and administrative responsibility in the election process to the 
Secretary of State, the county clerks, and, at least until 2011, in the local election officials. 9 
Through no fault of a candidate, one can envision any number of situations where an 
election, for whatever reason, is cancelled, voided, or otherwise not conducted, including a 
6 Reply Brief, p. 6. 
7 R. Vol. I, p. 18. 
8 Reply Brief, p. 7. 
9 Pursuant to I.C. § 34-1405, it is the county clerk and/or the "election official of the political subdivision" (pre-
2011) who bore the sole responsibility to notice an election. Pursuant to LC. § 34-206, the county clerk exercises 
general supervisory authority pertaining to the 
administration of the election laws by each local election official in his county for the purpose of 
achieving and maintaining a maximum degree of correctness, impartiality, efficiency, and 
uniformity in such administration by local election officials. 
(LC. § 34-206). The Idaho Secretary of State is the chief election officer of the State and has the "responsibility to 
obtain and maintain uniformity in the application, operation, and interpretation of the election laws". (LC. § 34-
201). The Idaho Secretary of State is responsible to provide all such comprehensive directives and election laws to 
all county clerks. (1.C. § 34-201 ). Each county clerk is required to comply with such directives and instruction by 
the secretary of state. Id. 
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terrorist attack 10, flood, earthquake, political upheaval, death of a candidate, or human error 
(failure to provide enough ballots, notices, etc.). 11 Having missed the November election date 
through no fault of the candidate12 and in the absence of any allegation of fraud or misconduct, 
Ms. Davis, as the incumbent, held office with authority of law until a successor was elected and 
qualified. The VCPA fails to cite to any authority demonstrating that the SVCRD's "ineffective 
and void" reappointment of Ms. Davis supplants LC.§ 31-4305.13 
10 For example, the 9-l l attack occurred on an election day for the democratic mayoral primary. The election was 
reset to September 25th after "all players" (Board of election officials and the candidates) discussed and accepted the 
consensus to cancel and reset the election. See, e.g., Philip Lentz, Election Day Attack On NY Unmakes Mayor 
Green; Sept. I !Events Cast Giuliani as a Hero, Transfer His Aura to Free-Spending Mike, CRA~'S N.Y.BUS., 
Mar. 4, 2002, at 9. 
11 See Jerry J. Goldfeder, Could Terrorists Derail a Presidential Election, 32 Fordham Urban Law Journal Article 4 
(2004). 
12 The VCP A goes to great length to condemn Ms. Davis and the SVCRD for following "bad advice". Since the 
preceding four (4) year term began in February, 2007, there was some confusion as to when this term would end. 
i.e. November 2011 election or February 2012 election. Given that the SVCRD missed the November election date 
and the Legislature's removal of February election date as an option, the earliest election was scheduled for May 
2011 pursuant to LC. § 34-601. What was to be done in the interim? The SVCRD consulted with the County's 
Election Officer, Jo Ann Fry, the Idaho Attorney General's Office (Brian Kane, Assistant Chief Deputy) and the 
Idaho Secretary of State's office (Tim Hurst, Chief Deputy) who cooperatively reached a solution. This is the 
proper procedure since the Idaho Secretary of State is the chief election officer with the "responsibility to obtain and 
maintain uniformity in the application, operation, and interpretation of the election laws". (LC. § 34-201). Each 
county clerk is required to comply with such directives and instruction by the secretary of state. Id. The solution 
was to reappoint the incumbent director pending the next available election date. While an incumbent holds office 
until a successor is elected and qualified, the SVCRD erred on the side of caution by also reappointing the 
incumbent director until the May 2011 election date. Thus, whether by incumbency or appointment, the incumbent 
served until the next available election date. 
13 Other meritless arguments presented by the VCPA include: 
a. The statutory requirement of an incumbent-holder over applies in instances of a one-person office such as 
a county assessor in Clark but does not apply to a three-person board since disenfranchisement is averted 
since the remainder two-person board can still function. Bereft of authority, the VCPA's theory is in direct 
conflict with LC. § 31-4305 which provides that "[E]ach district shall be governed by a board of three (3) 
directors." Id. Emphasis Added. 
b. This action is distinguishable from Clark since McFarland stood for election whereas Ms. Davis, "though 
in office for more than 10 years, had never been elected." This argument is ridiculous as no one had ever 
expressed a willingness to serve as a director for the SVCRD; i.e. she never had an opponent. Pursuant to 
I.C. § 31-4306(2), if only one candidate has been nominated for each director position and no declaration of 
intent is filed for a write-in candidate, the election shall be cancelled. In such instances, the Board "shall 
... declare such candidate elected as director, and the secretary ... shall immediately make and deliver to 
such person a certificate of election." 
c. Mootness The VCPA again asserts that its usurpation action should not be rendered moot by Yvette 
Davis' loss in the election because usurpation actions are viewed at the time the case is brought. This 
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B. Attorney fees 
Attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 are mandatory if the Court "finds that the non-
prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law". The VCPA claims it had 
standing and acted with a reasonable basis in fact and law; in fact that it was compulsorily 
required to "investigate procedural irregularities in the various election cycles."14 Whether the 
VCPA's mere investigation reveals the existence ofuncontested15 procedural irregularities which 
transpired at the time of the election16 as much as six years earlier is irrelevant. In fact, it is not 
even in dispute. Rather, it is the VCPA's lack of reasonable basis in fact and law is its failure to 
even allege much less demonstrate a fairly traceable causal connection between these 
analysis reaches the substantive merits of a usurpation action; not the threshold jurisdictional question 
whether the action is justiciable throughout all stages of the action. Ironically, the VCP A fails to raise any 
of the legal exceptions to the mootness doctrine (public necessity, repetition); all of which is irrelevant 
since the district court, while holding Ms. Davis action as moot, nonetheless substantively analyzed the 
VCPA's usurpation action applicable not only to Cowles, Smith, Keithly, but to Davis as well. 
14 Reply Brief, p. 10. We dispute this claimed authority. The VCPA does not have authority to investigate mere 
procedural irregularities in the election process. Rather, the Secretary of State and the county clerk are vested with 
the responsibility to investigate, supervise, and administer the procedural election process. The Idaho Secretary of 
State is the chief election officer of the State and has the "responsibility to obtain and maintain uniformity in the 
application, operation, and interpretation of the election laws". (LC. § 34-201 ). The Idaho Secretary of State is 
responsible to provide all such comprehensive directives and election laws to all county clerks. (l.C. § 34-201). 
Pursuant to I.C. § 34-206, the county clerk exercises general supervisory authority pertaining to the 
administration of the election laws by each local election official in his county for the purpose of 
achieving and maintaining a maximum degree of correctness, impartiality, efficiency, and 
uniformity in such administration by local election officials. 
Pursuant to LC.§ 34-214. 
( 1) Whenever it appears to a county clerk that any local election official in his county has failed to 
comply with any election law or any directive or instruction prepared and issued by the county 
clerk, the county clerk may issue an order to such local election official .... 
(2) If the local election official fails to comply as directed by the order of the county clerk, the 
county clerk may apply to a judge of the district court ... to compel the local election official to 
comply with the order of the county clerk or to show cause why he should not be so compelled. 
15 LC. § 34-2007 vests standing to only a qualified elector to contest a procedural error in an election. The VCPA is 
not an elector. 
16 Pursuant to LC. § 34-2008Error! Bookmark not defined., a procedural error must be challenged within twenty 
days. No elector or estranged candidate brought such a challenge asserting a denial of due process by virtue of said 
error. 
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uncontested de minimus procedural irregularities and a material impact to the result of the 
1 . d . h . b 17 e ection process ren enng t e mcum ent a usurper. 
The district court correctly distinguished between an election contest which, if timely 
brought, may focus upon procedural irregularities in the election process and usurpation of 
office, which is a substantive examination of the incumbent. The district court reasoned that 
Usurpation of office is a substantive examination of the incumbent; that is, his or 
her eligibility to lawfully hold title of an officer. Examples of usurpation occur 
when an elected official has been convicted of a felony or perhaps they did not 
live in the district where they were required to live. These are classic substantive 
conditions for an incumbent to lawfully hold a particular office. No such 
substantive conditions have been established here. 18 
Could a procedural irregularity have served as a valid election contest if timely brought 
by an elector or estranged candidate where the resultant election was materially impacted? 
Could a procedural irregularity substantively render an incumbent a usurper of office?19 Perhaps 
but the simple fact is that the aforementioned procedural irregularities went unchallenged and 
uncontested. Unlike Tiegs, the result of the election process is not in dispute. As the sole 
candidate in their respective election processes, the result of the election process is governed by 
I. C. § 31-4306(2) which mandated that the election was cancelled and that Ms. Davis, Mr. Smith, 
and Mr. Roberts must be declared "elected as director" with "authority of law". Thus, whether 
by election contest or usurpation, the VCPA's nexus is entirely speculative; that a lack of strict 
17 Certainly, a procedural irregularity could also amount to a substantive evaluation of an incumbent empowering a 
prosecutor to bring an action. However a mere duty to investigate does not vest a prosecutor with standing to bring 
a frivolous action. People ex rel. Neilson v. Wilkins, 101 Idaho 394, 396, 614 P.2d 417, 419 (1980); Tiegs v. 
Patterson, 79 Idaho 365, 368, 318 P.2d 588, 589 (1957)("Tiegs I"); Tiegs v. Patterson, 81 Idaho 46, 48, 336 P.2d 
687 ( l 959)("Tiegs II"). 
18 R. Vol. I, p. 20. 
19 For example in Tiegs v. Patterson, Patterson's standing was not based upon his challenge of the procedural error 
in the election. Tiegs II, 81 Idaho at 48. Rather, , Patterson's challenge was that he substantively won the election 
having received the majority of the votes as evidenced by the actual ballot boxes. "[A ]ppellant, alleging ... he had 
received the majority of the votes cast, has brought this action under the usurpation statute, and has not in any [way] 
contested the election." Id. 
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adherence to the notice statutes might have impacted the election process and could have 
prevented a candidate from filing a declaration of candidacy. Any impact of an unchallenged 
procedural error is speculative and ineffectual to void an election much less oust an incumbent 
years after the fact. The VCP A cannot escape attorney fees in reliance upon a purported a duty 
to investigate the merits of procedural claims absent a concomitant substantive impact to the 
election results. 
The VCP A further asserts that the Respondents lacked standing to seek attorney fees 
because the SVCRD indemnified its directors for actions undertaken within the course and scope 
of SVCRD business.20 The VCP A fails to cite to any authority that precludes an award of 
attorney fees for frivolous litigation merely because a third party indemnifier paid the defense 
costs. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants respectfully request that this Court affirm the 
district court's Decision but for its summary denial of attorney fees; directing the district court to 
award the Defendants' reasonable attorney fees and costs both below and on appeal. 
Dated this 20th day of June, 2012. 
aul J. Fitzer 
Attorney for the County 
Defendants/Respondents 
*** 
20 The VCP A's allegation pertains to facts that are not in evidence and further are simply incorrect. By way of 
candor to the Court, attorney fees are most certainly disputed as between the current SVCRD and its former 
directors. Whether the dispute is rendered moot or will ripen into a justiciable case or controversy is dependent 
upon this Court's resolution of the attorney fee issue. Given that all of the alleged procedural errors are attributable 
to negligent or wrongful acts or omissions committed within the course and scope of the SVCRD election process, it 
is an open question whether the SVCRD is required to indemnify its former directors pursuant to LC.§ 6-903 or 
common law doctrines such as Respondeat Superior or whether the fonner directors are required to defend 
themselves and/or reimburse the SVCRD. 
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